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To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus spe-
cially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take
possession of a boundless field of power, no longer sus-
ceptible of any definition.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history, the United States has implemented
an erratic immigration policy. Schizophrenic in nature, U.S.
immigration policy has vacillated over time between a willing-
ness to accommodate nearly everyone and an intolerance reflect-
ed by policies excluding "undesirables."2 Prevailing social, eco-
nomic, and political moods dictate American attitudes toward
immigration. Currently, these factors combine to produce a de-
cidedly anti-immigrant sentiment.3 Many Americans may be
against immigration because they believe it speeds the onset of
the Malthusian nightmare.' Notwithstanding the public's disfa-
vor, however, national policy has been rather generous.' Amidst
1. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establish-
ing a National Bank, in LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 41, 42 (Jefferson Powell ed., 1991).
2. See J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PAITERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM
1860-1925 (1955).
3. Thomas Muller, Missing the Boat on Immigration, NEWSDAY, June 18, 1995,
at 37; see also Peter Brimelow, National Transformation in the Making?, WASH.
TIMES., May 30, 1995, at A13 (detailing how public opinion has been, and still is,
against immigration).
4. Reverend Thomas R. Malthus, an English economist, explored the effects of
a geometrically increasing population on an arithmetically increasing food supply. He
predicted that unchecked population increases would always outstrip the production
of food. "IThe necessary and inevitable consequence appears to be that the same
produce must be divided among a greater number, and consequently that a day's
labour will purchase a smaller quantity of provisions...." THOMAS MALTHUS, POP-
ULATION: THE FIRST ESSAY 47 (1959).
5. JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 349-354
(1989).
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the changing policies, one idea remains unassailable: the federal
government has the exclusive power and responsibility to devel-
op and enforce immigration policy. The U.S. Constitution6 and
the judiciary support this proposition.7
Recent lawsuits, over immigration policy, by six states
against the federal government both challenge and rely upon the
federal government's absolute authority over immigration.8 The
affected states do not claim formal policy-making powers for
themselves. Their lawsuits, nevertheless, attempt to establish a
de facto policy role.
These lawsuits allege that the federal government has ne-
glected its exclusive duty to enforce the immigration laws. As a
consequence, the affected states assert that they have borne the
costs of the Federal Abdication and Default Policy.9 According to
recent estimates, the cost is substantial.' ° Since immigration
6. The U.S. Constitution provides: The Congress shall have "[plower .. . to
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
7. Numerous judicial decisions support the federal government's plenary au-
thority to develop and implement immigration policy. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787 (1977); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding Congress's plenary
power over immigration); Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274
(1876) ("We are of the opinion that this whole subject has been confided to Congress
by the Constitution; that Congress can more appropriately and with more acceptance
exercise it than any other body known to our law, state and national . . . "). See
also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984); VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR, IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 16 (1984) (explaining that beyond the tangential
Constitutional grant that "Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization," the federal authority over immigration derives from the principle of
national sovereignty).
8. Florida, California, Texas, Arizona, and New Jersey are all suing the feder-
al government seeking reimbursement for alleged costs incurred as a result of illegal
immigration. These states will hereinafter be referred to as the "affected states."
New York has recently filed suit, but its complaint was unavailable for analysis at
publication. Two federal district courts have dismissed the complaints filed by Flori-
da and California. For a discussion of the grounds for dismissal, see infra note 177.
9. Federal Abdication and Default Policy is the term used by Florida in its
complaint to describe the federal government's inability to effectively enforce the
immigration laws. State of Florida Compl. at 13-14, Chiles v. U.S., (S.D. Fla 1994)
(No. 94-0676) [hereinafter Chiles Complaint] (Lawton Chiles is currently the governor
of Florida).
10. In an effort to determine the fiscal impacts of undocumented aliens on the
seven states in which 85% of the undocumented aliens reside (Florida, California,
Arizona, Texas, New York, New Jersey and Illinois), a bipartisan study, commis-
sioned by the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Justice
estimated the costs of supplying education, incarceration, and emergency medical
services. With the exception of partial reimbursement of medicaid costs by the feder-
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policy is exclusively within the federal government's domain,'
the affected states are legally powerless to reduce the cost of
immigration.12 Thus, the question the states have posed is:
Who should bear this cost? This essay submits that the substan-
tial costs imposed by federal immigration policy on a small num-
ber of states cannot be written off as merely the workings of
majoritarian politics. Rather, the federal burden represents
unconstitutional cost-shifting.
The federal government's refusal to reimburse the affected
states for immigration costs highlights the tension in federal-
state relations over who should pay for federal policies that
impose unreimbursed costs on states. 3 This issue is often la-
al government, these costs are nearly fully borne by the states. The study estimates
the total annual cost to these states at $4 billion. See REBECCA L. CLARK ET AL.,
THE URBAN INSTITUTE, FISCAL IMPACTS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: SELECTED ESTI-
MATES FOR SEVEN STATES 56 (1994) [hereinafter URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT]. Despite
its neutrality, the immigration report has been attacked by some as inaccu-
rate-albeit mostly from those states which, according to the report, had overesti-
mated the costs of undocumented aliens. See Editorial, Muddy Study: Report on
Illegal Immigration's Cost is of Little Help, Hous. POST, Sept. 18, 1994, at C2.
11. See supra notes 6-7.
12. Although the affected states' power to influence immigration policy is feeble
at best, due to the electoral importance of the affected states, the President has
been somewhat responsive. See Roberto Suro, Clinton Requests $350 Million to Help
States Meet Costs of Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1994, at A10.
Congress' response, however, has been more tepid. For example, Florida Congress-
man Alcee Hastings said the problem:
[Ils getting enough votes in Congress to carry out those ideas [combating
illegal immigration]. Members of Congress from states that do not have
major immigration problems view Florida's complaints as a local issue
rather than a national or international one .... Even among Florida's
23 representatives there is little cooperation .... I'm not hopeful we
will be able to get many solutions through the House of Representatives.
Bob Knotts, Lisa Ocker and Michael E. Young, Legal Immigration Earns Forum
Praise, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 1994, at IA; see also Marc Sandalow, 40 Lawmakers
Back Florida Suit on Illegals, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 1994, at AS (reporting that of
the forty congressmen who support Florida's lawsuit, most are from the affected
states).
Notwithstanding Congressional "horsetrading", why would congressmen from
the forty-three unaffected states choose to reimburse the affected states? Assuming a
finite pool of federal funds, any money spent on the affected states necessarily re-
duces the money available for national programs that placate national constituencies.
See discussion infra part II.A.2.
13. See Peter Dreier, Detouring the Motor-Voter Law: Fear of Franchise, NA-
TION, Oct. 31, 1994, at 490 (covering California's refusal to implement the federal
law because it is an unfunded mandate); Paul Gillmor and Fred Eames, Reconstruc-
tion of Federalism: A Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (1993); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates,
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beled "unfunded mandates." The unreimbursed immigration
costs operate as unfunded mandates, undermining the delicate
federal/state balance intended by the Framers and set forth in
the Constitution. The argument is about federalism:15 Does it
matter, and if so, what is the proper form and method of en-
forcement?
This essay explores how the Supreme Court's uncertain
doctrine of federalism, most recently articulated in New York v.
U.S., 6 might apply to a federal immigration policy that shifts
Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest and
Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1993).
14. The Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 defines "Federal Mandate" as
"any provision in a statute or regulation or any federal court ruling that imposes an
enforceable duty upon states, local governments, or tribal governments including a
condition of federal assistance or a duty arising from participation in a voluntary
federal program." Unfunded Mandate Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48
(1995).
15. I use the term "federalism" to refer to both the structural division of po-
litical authority between the national and state governments and a normative con-
struct where state governments are given greater power over their own internal
policy affairs in areas that do not require uniform national policy. See generally Ann
Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dia-
logue, 42 DuKE L.J. 979 (1993). I do not favor returning power to the states, solely,
for the sake of enhancing "states rights"; there is no purpose in such a position. Nor
do I crusade for a return to the federal-state balance of power espoused during
Jefferson's time. Rather, I draw my argument for a re-evaluation of federalism from
the rich pedigree of political commentary dating back to the Constitutional Conven-
tion which maintains that federalism promotes the welfare of our nation.
16. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). In New York v. U.S., the Supreme Court invali-
dated the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 [hereinafter the Act]. Faced with a crisis in storing low-level ra-
dioactive waste, the Act created various deadlines and incentives designed to force
states to develop sites for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The Act's in-
centives were phased in over three stages that corresponded with some of the dead-
lines imposed by the Act. First, the three existing disposal sites were required to
remain open but could, after July 1, 1986, collect surcharges on waste generated
from outside of the state or regional compact to which the state was a party. A
portion of the surcharges were placed in an escrow account. States that met certain
deadlines received payments from this account. The surcharges escalated until Janu-
ary 1, 1990, which triggered the second phase, under which sites could deny access
to material from states not in compliance with the Act's deadlines. The final stage
provided that if a state could not dispose of all the waste produced within its terri-
tory by January 1, 1996, the owner of the waste could require the state to take title
to-the waste and assume all obligations including direct and indirect liability in-
curred by the owner of the waste as a result of the state's failure to take posses-
sion. Id. at 2414-17. The Court upheld the first two provisions of the act but inval-
idated the "take title" provision. The Court found that the "take title" provision
unconstitutionally commandeered states into implementing a federal program in
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 2434.
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substantial costs from the federal government to a few states.
Stated differently, is the affected states' reliance on New York v.
U.S. proper? Some question the validity of the lawsuits them-
selves.17 Specifically, Part II analyzes the state claims as they
relate to the Tenth Amendment, and seeks to develop a test
under which a court might evaluate the novel equality argument
set forth by the states. Part III briefly discusses whether a court
can or should fashion relief.18 Part IV addresses the possible
effects these lawsuits may have on federalism, immigration pol-
icy and immigrants themselves. The conclusion asserts that a
court may decide in the states' favor and remain consistent with
New York without undermining Congress' plenary power over
immigration.
II. VIOLATIONS COMMITrED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. Constitutional Norms of Equality
Two of the five affected states argue that the federal govern-
ment has an obligation to impose and enforce the immigration
laws, as well as an obligation to do so in a way that affects the
states equally. 9 The affected states also allege that the federal
17. Many people accused the respective governors of the affected states of suing
the federal government strictly as a political ploy to gain votes in closely contested
elections. See Neal R. Peirce, The Ugly - But Inevitable - Debate, NATL J., July
16, 1994, at 1700 (reporting on allegations that Governor Wilson used "veiled rac-
ism" to bolster an ailing gubernatorial campaign). These claims may be valid (four of
the six governors: Florida, California, Texas, and Arizona were in extremely tight re-
election races and there is a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment as evidenced by
California's Proposition 187). Nevertheless, the claims do not affect the validity of
the affected states' lawsuits. Unless standing analysis is affected, the validity of a
constitutional challenge suffers no infirmity by virtue of a challenger's self-interest.
18. The brevity with which I discuss the justiciability of the affected states'
suits does not reflect its importance in determining the outcome of these suits. In-
deed, the political question doctrine may prove the greatest obstacle to judicial reso-
lution in favor of the affected states. Nevertheless, as this paper focuses on the
impact of these lawsuits on federalism, a more thorough treatment of justiciability
is, regrettably, omitted. For a more throrough discussion of justiciability, see gener-
ally CHARLES GORDON POST, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
(1969). See also Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at
the Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1548, (1993)
19. None of the affected states broadly assert a right to equal treatment, vis-a-
vis all other states, within the immigration context. Rather Florida and Texas, for
different reasons, cite to Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution (pro-
viding Congress the power to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization .. . ") as
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restrictions under the Medicaid and Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children ("AFDC") programs, as they apply to immigrants,
violate this equality."0 By combining the federal government's
obligation to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization"21 with
the restriction imposed upon federal spending under the General
Welfare Clause,2 the affected states argue that the Constitu-
tion implicitly commands that they be treated equally under
spending programs concerning immigration. 3
The federal government counters that both Medicaid and
one of the bases for their claims against the federal government. See Chiles Com-
plaint, supra note 9, at 29; State of Texas Compl. at 14, Texas v. U.S., (S.D. Tex.
1994) (No. B94-228) [hereinafter Texas Complaint]. Texas cites Article I, Section 8,
Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution to demonstrate that Congress has both the power
and responsibility to establish, implement, enforce and pay for immigration policy.
Because the federal government has not reimbursed Texas for its expenditures relat-
ed to illegal immigrants, Texas claims that the federal government is unconstitution-
ally neglecting its duty. Id. at 14. Florida, however, cites Article I, Section 8, Claus-
es 1 & 4 of the U.S. Constitution to support its equality argument [hereinafter
Norm of Equality Theory] attacking the federal government's unequal distribution of
matching funds under the Federal Medicaid and AFDC programs. See Chiles Com-
plaint, supra note 9, at 91. Florida maintains that federal restrictions on the Medic-
aid and AFDC programs, which preclude states with large numbers of illegal alien
recipients from receiving federal assistance on the same basis as those states with
relatively few illegal aliens, are discriminatory and blatantly unconstitutional. See
PL's Mem. Law Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 7-8, Chiles v. U.S., (S.D. Fla 1994)
(No. 94-0676) [hereinafter Chiles Reply].
20. According to the Medicaid and AFDC authorizing and implementing stat-
utes, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b, 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.406, 435.408 and 42 U.S.C. § 202, 45
C.F.R. §§ 233.50, 233.51, 233.52, the federal government will not reimburse the
states for any expenses incurred on behalf of an alien not having a specified "lawful
status." An exception is made in the narrow cases where an illegal immigrant needs
treatment for "emergency medical conditions." Chiles Reply, supra note 19, at 45.
There is disagreement over whether the federal government reimburses Florida for
even "emergency medical conditions." Mot. Dismiss at 49, Chiles v. U.S., (S.D. Fla
1994) (No. 94-0676) [hereinafter Government's Motion to Dismiss] (noting that since
the Urban Institute Study does not mention federal reimbursement to the states of
Medicaid expenditures for "emergency medical conditions", the federal government
has not reimbursed the states for these costs). See also State of California's Compl.
at 12-21, California v. United States, (Gen Dist. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter California
Complaint].
Owing to Florida's large illegal immigrant population and the limited federal
reimbursement for medical care, Florida must absorb disproportionate costs vis-a-vis
states having small illegal immigrant populations.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 [hereinafter Clause].
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing that "[tihe Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." [herein-
after the General Welfare Clause]).
23. See Chiles Complaint, supra note 9, at 32.
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AFDC are voluntary programs in which the states choose wheth-
er to participate.24 Thus, it argues that the affected states' reli-
ance on the General Welfare Clause is unavailing according to
the federal government's reading of recent Supreme Court
spending cases.25 The federal government further contends that
the Naturalization Clause is a grant of discretionary power, not
an affirmative duty that the states may enforce on their be-
half." While the affected states' theory concerning a constitu-
tional norm of equality may fairly be characterized as "novel,"27
one should remember that today's "creative" interpretational
theories often become tomorrow's accepted jurisprudence."5
The Supreme Court's interpretation of conditional spending
programs enacted by Congress pursuant to the Spending
24. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Opp'n Pl.'s Partial Summ. J. Mot. at 33, Chiles v. U.S.,
(S.D. Fla 1994) (No. 94-0676) [hereinafter Government's Opposition] (acknowledging
that while a state may have a "strong" practical inducement to participate, no state
is legally required to participate in either program).
25. Mem. Reply Pl.'s Opp'n Def's Mot. Dismiss at 25-30, Chiles v. U.S., (S.D.
Fla 1994) (No. 94-0676) [hereinafter Government's Memorandum]. The spending cases
relied upon by the federal government are: New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct.
2408 (1992) (stating that the federal government may offer financial assistance to
states, which they are free to accept or reject, and condition the assistance on the
state's agreement to comply with federal restrictions on the use of funds for that
program); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (conditioning the grant of fed-
eral highway funds to the states on their agreement to raise the drinking age. Al-
though it is an area of constitutional authority reserved to the states); Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (sustaining the federal government's conditioning of
educational grants upon public schools providing bilingual education to non-English
speaking public school students); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d
Cir. 1973) cert. denied sub nom. Lavine v. Lindsay, 412 U.S. 950 (1973) (rejecting a
challenge which argued that health care and public assistance were national prob-
lems to which the states were forced to contribute through programs such as Medic-
aid). While the federal government's argument is not without merit, the unique
status of illegal immigrants may caution against the application of the most recent
spending clause cases.
26. See Government's Opposition, supra note 24, at 29. In addition to deter-
mining whether the Clause is an enforceable duty, a court must determine to whom
the federal government owes such a duty. Is this duty owed to the states, U.S.
citizens, or both? This determination is critical for standing analysis.
27. See Government's Memorandum, supra note 25, at 27.
28. See the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962). Consider also the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs .... It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immu-
table rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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Clause9 has significant ramifications for federal-state rela-
tions."0 As power has become increasingly centralized,31 partly
due to the Supreme Court's condoning of coercive spending pro-
grams," the tension in federal-state fiscal relations has
prompted calls for a Constitutional Amendment to restore integ-
rity to our federal-state structure."
1. The Federal Government's Duty to Establish and Administer
Immigration Policy
In examining the validity of the affected states' Norm of
Equality Theory as applied to spending programs touching on
immigration, one must determine the constitutional grounding of
the federal government's duty to establish an immigration poli-
cy. "The Congress shall have Power ... To establish a uniform
Rule of Naturalization. .. ."" While "naturalization" is not the
equivalent of "immigration", the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the federal government has exclusive control over
immigration. 5 An examination of the Framers' intent proves no
more insightful than the language of the Naturalization
Clause.6 Consider that naturalization presumes immigration;
29. This clause is the identical one described as the General Welfare Clause in
supra note 22. I use the General Welfare Clause and Spending Clause inter-
changeably, depending upon whether I am describing an affirmative grant of power
(Spending Clause) or an asserted limitation on that power (General Welfare Clause).
30. See generally Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 85 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
decision in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) may impact federalism far
more than National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)); see also Federal -
State - Local Fiscal Relations, (Dep't of Treas. 1985) (Report to the President and
Congress); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM 103-34
(1992) (describing the influence of federal grants-in-aid programs in shaping "cooper-
ative federalism"). Cooperative federalism is a euphemistic term that describes the
"structuring of national-state relations by the coercive use of formal preemption pow-
ers, cross-over sanctions, and tax sanctions." Id. at 7-10. See also A. H. BIRCH, FED-
ERALISM, FINANCE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION 25 (1955) ("The basis of political inde-
pendence is financial independence").
31. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEw FROM THE STATES
101-105 (1984).
32. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 30.
33. See Gillmor & Eames, supra note 13.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (hereinafter Naturalization Clause).
35. See supra notes 6-7.
36. If the states, prior to the Constitution, regarded themselves as independent
sovereigns, see Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
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those born in the United States are citizens upon birth, leaving
only immigrants in need of naturalization. Moreover, the federal
government, notwithstanding its current performance, is better
situated to handle immigration concerns.37
How should one interpret "uniform" within the Naturaliza-
tion Clause? Did the Framers intend to guarantee uniformity or
merely assure that the states were not facially discriminated
against? As an interpretive aid one may examine how courts
have defined "uniform" within the bankruptcy and indirect tax
contexts.38 Again, the debates in the Constitutional Convention
shed no light on the Framers' intent." The purpose of these
uniformity clauses was to prevent "undue preferences of one
state over another in the regulation of subjects affecting their
common interests."4" Courts have held that the uniformity re-
quirement in the impost, duty and excise clause, however, does
not require Congress to devise a tax that falls equally upon each
state." Courts have held likewise for federal bankruptcy
laws."2
The affected states do not explain how the immigration
rules are not "uniform." Rather, they assert that the effects of
illegal immigration resulting from federal policy are not uni-
HARV. L. REV. 885, 928-929 (1985), and had pre-constitutionally exercised power over
immigration, one can infer from the absence of debate in the Constitutional Conven-
tion over who should control immigration, that either the states did not regard it as
an important power or the states assumed that the Naturalization Clause included
authority over immigration.
37. See Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1876). "We
are of the opinion that this whole subject has been confided to Congress by the
Constitution; that Congress can more appropriately and with more acceptance exer-
cise it than any other body known to our law, state and national. . . . " Id. Addi-
tionally, public opinion has consistently disfavoured immigration, see Muller, supra
note 3, at 350-56 (1989), such that states previously passed laws attempting to ex-
clude certain groups of immigrants. See also BRIGGS, supra note 7, at 28. Although
the Supreme Court invalidated these laws, the lesson was clear: as in commerce,
immigration matters needed to be dealt with on a national level.
38. "Uniform" is used three times in U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8 to modify: duties,
imposts and excises (clause 1); rules of naturalization (clause 4); and bankruptcy
laws (clause 4).
39. The duty, impost and excise clause, for example, was proposed on August
25 and adopted on August 31 without discussion. See M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 417-418, 481 (1911).
40. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 957
(T. Cooley ed., 1873).
41. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 82 (1983).
42. See Darling v. Berry, 13 F. 659 (C.C.D. Iowa 1882).
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form.43 In doing so, the states effectively define "rule" to include
the rule or law itself, the methods of enforcement, and the ef-
fects of such enforcement. While arguably more rational," the
affected states definition of "rule" within Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, is broader than its accepted
legal meaning4" and not supported by prior decisions."
43. With the exception of Florida's Medicaid and AFDC claim that is derived
from its fusion of the General Welfare Clause and the Clause, see supra note 19, the
affected states do not, and indeed cannot, argue that federal immigration laws as
written are not uniform. See Texas Complaint, supra note 19, at 13-14. Thus, the af-
fected states' argument is that the lax enforcement of the immigration laws, not the
laws themselves, unequally impacts the states and is therefore non-uniform.
44. One might argue that a rule is not only defined by what it says, but also
how it is applied. See WILLIAM TWINING AND DAViD MiERS, How To Do THiNGS
WITH RULES 69-73 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that Holmes' "Bad Man" defines law as it
operates upon society; caring not for the text of the law, but rather concerning him-
self with the law's most likely interpretation or implementation). What good is a
uniformity requirement if a statute, according to its terms, is uniform, but is know-
ingly and regularly applied to create a situation of gross disparity among the states.
After all, the protection was meant to be real, not merely apparent.
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (6th ed. 1990) defines rule as: "a principle
or regulation set up by authority, prescribing or directing action or forbearance."
46. See Thomas v. Woods, 173 F. 585, 590 (8th Cir. 1909); Darling v. Berry, 13
F. 659 (C.C.D. Iowa 1882) (explaining that "uniformity" as used in Article I, § 8,
clause 4, relates to the law itself, not the operation or working of the law). "[Wlhen
a . . naturalization law is made by its terms applicable alike to all the states of the
Union, without distinction or discrimination, it cannot be successfully questioned on
the ground that it is not uniform, in the sense of the constitution, merely because
its operation or working may be wholly different in one state from another." Id. at
667. However, the affected states' claims are somewhat distinguishable from the
above cases. Thomas and Darling dealt with federal bankruptcy laws which, due to
differences in state laws, operated unevenly among the states. While the federal law
was uniform, its operation was not, due to variations in state laws. The affected
states' argument is stronger because their own state laws are not responsible for the
disproportionate number of illegal immigrants they have absorbed. Ineffective en-
forcement of federal immigration laws by the federal government is the sole reason
for the non-uniform numbers of illegal immigrants visited upon these states. Contra
Government's Memorandum, supra note 25 (the federal government argues that the
affected states are providing incentives to illegal immigration by providing aliens
with services above and beyond what are constitutionally required). This assumes,
however, that illegal immigrants might stay in their home country or immigrate to a
country other than the U.S. if the states did not offer these benefits. This is an
implausible assumption given the standard of living and general social conditions in
the countries from which the greatest numbers of immigrants come (e.g., Haiti, Cu-
ba, and Mexico).
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2. Federal Policy Must Apply Equally to All States
The affected states also rely on the General Welfare Clause
to support their Norm of Equality Theory.4" Pursuant to this
clause, Congress must make expenditures for the general wel-
fare. The affected states contend that Congress is not spending
for the general welfare when it funds programs on the basis of
need for some states and not others.4" Yet, it does not necessar-
ily follow that federal money disbursed to all the states, albeit in
unequal amounts, runs afoul of the "general welfare" lan-
guage.4 In fact, the Supreme Court has never struck down
congressional action under the spending power for failure to
meet the "general welfare" criterion."
From a contemporary standpoint, a textual analysis of the
General Welfare Clause reveals its broad implications." Gov-
ernment action is more often than not presumed to be in the
"general welfare." The Framers abhorred such a presumption for
fear that this clause would develop into a source of unlimited
power.52 Although Framers' intent is an imperfect guide," the
argument that the Framers intended the General Welfare Clause
as a limit rather than an independent grant is convincing.'
47. "Congress shall have the power to collect taxes and spend the same for the
"general Welfare of the United States" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
48. See Chiles Reply, supra note 19, at 47.
49. As argued by the federal government, the General Welfare Clause is a grant
of power, not a limitation on federal power. See City of New York v. Richardson,
473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub norn. Lavine v. Lindsay, 412 U.S. 950
(1973) (rejecting the requirement that each state be given equal treatment in the
context of a spending program).
50. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (1987).
51. As a product of increasing governmentalism we surely conceive of a great
deal more within the "general welfare" than did the Framers.
52. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS DESIGN 100-119 (1987).
Thomas Jefferson dourly predicted that the General Welfare Clause:
[W]ould reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of insti-
tuting a Congress, with power to do whatever would be for the good of
the United States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or
evil, it would be a power to do whatever evil they pleased.
TImoTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERI-
CA 128 (Rothman & Co. 1993) (1867) (quoting Thomas Jefferson (1791)).
53. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983).
54. See BERGER, supra note 52, at 100-19. Consider also the Supreme Court's
determination of the Framers' intent in drafting the General Welfare Clause: "These
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Since the New Deal, however, the Supreme Court has large-
ly ignored the Framers' intent.5 Thus, we must turn to the Su-
preme Court's controlling spending cases in evaluating the af-
fected states' Medicaid and AFDC claims. The affected states
argue that the conditions imposed upon them under the Medic-
aid and AFDC programs are coercive.56 Relying on South Dako-
ta v. Dole,57 the federal government argues that it may offer
financial assistance to states, who are free to accept or reject it,
on the condition that the states agree to abide by federal restric-
tions." These conditions may even apply to areas where the
federal government could not legislate directly. 9 Many who
realize the toll that this back-door legislating takes on federal-
ism consider it constitutionally impermissible.'s Usually, how-
words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used. The conclusion
must be that they were intended to limit and define the granted power to raise and
expend money." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1935).
55. See BERGER, supra note 52, at 117. The Supreme Court's modern approach
states: "Appellants' 'general welfare' contention erroneously treats the General Wel-
fare Clause as a limitation upon congressional power. It is rather a grant of power,
the scope of which is quite expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement of
power by the Necessary and Proper Clause." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91
(1976).
56. See California Complaint, supra note 20, at 18 (arguing that without a sub-
stitute source of funds, California cannot choose to discontinue the program despite
the substantial burdens it imposes upon the state). In the same respect a drug ad-
dict does not "choose" to further his addiction when he continues to participate in
drug abuse. He may have exercised choice up until the time he became addicted,
but beyond that point any meaningful choice is non-existent. The question lies in
whether the addict had full knowledge of all the deleterious externalities of drug
abuse before he became addicted. Conceivably, the addict did not realize or antici-
pate that drug abuse would likely destroy his body and mind. In this sense, his
initial "choice" is illegitimate, because uninformed, and his subsequent drug abuse is
predicated on the coercive nature of addiction rather than continued choice. Similar-
ly, if California initially "chose" to participate in the Medicaid and AFDC programs
at a time of non-existent or extremely limited illegal immigration, and later grew
dependent on the federal funding, their continuing participation in the programs-
notwithstanding the imposition of deleterious externalities-may not be voluntary in
any sense of the word. California's continued participation in these programs most
likely derives from coercion rather than choice; see also CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE
OF FEDERALISM: REPORT AND PAPERS, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 99 (1981). "[T]o speak of 'voluntary' acceptance of these conditions as
though in contrast to the 'coercion' of direct mandates is pure fantasy. Applying
these terms honestly to public decision-making in today's federal system, the realistic
conclusion must be that states have no choice." Id.
57. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). In Dole, the Court upheld a federal statute that condi-
tioned the receipt of federal highway funds upon state enactment of a twenty-one
year old minimum age level for alcohol consumption.
58. See Government's Memorandum, supra note 25, at 26.
59. See South Dakota V. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
60. Gillmor & Eames, supra note 13, and supra notes 16-19 and accompanying
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ever, these constitutional objectors do not assert that the federal
spending program is outside the "general welfare," but rather
that it breaches an independent constitutional limit such as the
Tenth Amendment." Because the affected states' Norm of
Equality Theory relies on placing internal limits (General Wel-
fare Clause and the uniformity requirement of the Naturaliza-
tion Clause) on the federal government's power to impose restric-
tions on Medicaid and AFDC, it will likely be rejected under the
Supreme Court's current Spending Clause analysis.62
3. Proposed Test: Enhanced Norm of Equality
This essay contends that the affected states might be justi-
fied in asserting a broader concept of their Norm of Equality
Theory. The fundamental premise the affected states might
allude to is the notion that states deserve equal treatment under
federal law.' Such an application of the Equal Protection
Clause, to be sure, is not universally accepted,' and may prove
text; see also Note, Federalism, Political Accountability and the Spending Clause, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1419 (1994).
61. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
62. The Court's analysis under Dole provides that: 1) the exercise of the spend-
ing power must be in pursuit of the general welfare and courts should defer to
Congress' determination that a particular expenditure is intended to serve general
public purposes.; 2) if Congress decides to condition a state's receipt of federal funds
it must do so unambiguously; 3) conditions on federal grants should be related to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs; 4) other constitution-
al provisions may provide an independent bar to the condition of federal funds. See
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). It is only under the fourth factor that
the affected states can plausibly argue that the federal restrictions are unconstitu-
tional. The success of their Norm of Equality Theory is unlikely precisely because
the affected states ground their Medicaid and AFDC claims on internal limits, rather
than the external limits of the fourth factor.
63. Such an Equal Protection-like argument might contend that the total costs
imposed on the states (education, incarceration, and medical assistance) infringe
upon the fundamental right to representative government at the state and local level
embodied in the Guarantee Clause, which states that "The United States shall guar-
antee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4.
64. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause relates to equal protection of the laws 'be-
tween persons as such rather than between areas'." Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 230 (1964) (quoting Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551 (1954));
see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 184 (1977) ("For it is the 'laws' of the State, not of the
nation, that are required to afford 'equal protection.'). But see United States v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (J. Mikva, concurring). "Congress has no
power . . . to single out any particular state for distinct treatment under a federal
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problematic.'
Nonetheless, it is clear that the affected states are suffering
under the discriminatory federal immigration policy.' The fed-
eral government has knowledge that its lax enforcement of im-
migration laws has caused and will continue to cause substan-
tial costs to be imposed upon the affected states.'? "The sad fact
is that by blindfolding itself to illegal immigration for so long,
the United States invited today's fiscal standoff and crisis in
federalism."' Furthermore, the acknowledged discriminatory
impact of federal immigration policy is not a "federally crafted
discrimination," 9 predicated on considered national goals. The
disproportionate economic burdens under which the affected
states suffer are not the result of the acceptable territorial dis-
crimination linked to the operation of self-government in our
federal system.70 The federal government's contention that the
affected states have brought this economic inequality upon
themselves is strained indeed.
Although the federal government argues that any costs the
affected states incur are assumed voluntarily7 or because of
constitutional obligations,72 these contentions are without mer-
it. The federal government asserts that the affected states actu-
ally encourage illegal immigration by providing Medicaid and
statutory scheme. A uniform federal rule ought presumptively to apply nationwide.
That presumption, in my view, should invoke the equal protection component." Id;
see also Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-
Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987) (arguing that regional discrimination
should be subject to equal protection analysis where the discrimination impinges
upon fundamental rights).
65. In the interest of brevity, I will not discuss the standing problems posed by
a state qua state asserting an Equal Protection challenge. Additionally, applying a
broad equal protection analysis to federal policy which unequally impacts states
could undermine most, if not all current federal policy. Consequently, the viability of
such an analysis would depend on the extent to which one could develop a princi-
pled construct that accommodates the realities of modern governance, yet still recog-
nizes that extraordinary abuse of principles of equality is impermissible.
66. See URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT supra note 10.
67. See Chiles Complaint, supra note 9, at 14.
68. Peirce, supra note 17.
69. Neuman, supra note 64, at 344.
70. Id. at 265, 344-48.
71. See supra note 56 (discussing whether the states "chose" to incur these
costs).
72. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that states must educate
illegal immigrants who are of school-age).
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AFDC benefits where federal law does not provide any. Addi-
tionally, the federal government argues that states are "choos-
ing" to assume costs when they arrest and incarcerate illegal
immigrants for breaking state laws." This is a disingenuous
characterization of "choice."74 It is true that providing emergen-
cy medical care services, and incarcerating illegal aliens who
break state law are not functions the Constitution requires of
states. These programs, however, are practically required to
prevent the spread of disease,7" lawlessness, etc. They are un-
deniably some of the most fundamental reasons for forming a
polity.
No one can deny that states are entities in their own right.
Neither completely sovereign, nor mere geographic subdivisions
of the federal government, they are partners in our compound
republic.7" The federal government's "choice" argument asks the
states to choose between providing services to illegal immigrants
to maintain the health and welfare of its citizenry -thereby
foregoing federal reimbursement- or neglecting its citizens'
needs -thereby promoting anarchy. Such a Hobson's choice puts
the affected states in a lose-lose situation. They must effectively
73. See Government's Memorandum, supra note 25, at 32.
74. See Wayne 0. Hanewicz, New York v. United States: The Court Sounds a
Return to the Battle Scene, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1605, 1624 (1993). Also consider the
situation in which my neighbor's negligently maintained irrigation dam ruptures and
water floods my farm. My "choice" consists of whether to pay X amount now to
pump the water from my farm, or (X + 1) amount later to assume the costs of crop
damage. Either alternative imposes the costs of another's inaction upon me. A cost-
free alternative does not exist. Am I to be held responsible for the cost of pumping
the water from my farm on the notion that I "chose" to do so? Assuming I have a
right to protect my farm, what was my alternative? Similarly, if the states refused
to provide bare-bone services such as Medicaid, incarceration, and education today,
they would merely incur greater economic and social costs in the future. For exam-
ple, a state's refusal to incarcerate illegal immigrants that break the law would
allow criminals to roam free, exposing its citizens to danger. A state's refusal to
vaccinate or provide emergency medical treatment to illegal immigrants would expose
its citizens to health dangers (e.g., polio, measles, tetanus, etc.).
Without question, a state has a right to ensure a general quality of life by
providing services to its citizens to the best of its ability. If refusing to provide
minimal services to illegal aliens jeopardizes this right, one can understand how a
state has no choice but to provide these services.
75. See Government's Memorandum, supra note 25, at 32.
76. The Constitution "leaves to the several states a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 232 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51. "In the compound republic of America, the
power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments."
Id. at 325.
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choose between incurring costs and non-existence.77 Courts
have clearly condemned federal policies, such as the current
federal immigration policy, which call for a surrender by the
states of powers essential to their quasi-sovereign existence.78
Therefore, it is undeniable that, at some level, states de-
serve equal treatment before the federal government.79 The
problem lies in determining how a court might apply a concept
as amorphous as "equality." Should a court consider unequal
distribution of benefits as well as burdens? Or is a net effect test
preferable? What time-frame should a court use in evaluating
purported unequal treatment?
One possible test is a consistent, direct, impairment analysis
available to a state or a small number' of similarly situated
77. The federal government cannot abolish states, nor localities. By severely
constraining state and local legislative choice, especially in those states subject to a
state balanced budged amendment, the federal government indirectly destroys the
states by undermining their ability to respond to citizen needs. In essence, the eco-
nomic burdens placed on the affected states, as a result of federal immigration poli-
cy, function as a representative tax, drawing upon the representative capital avail-
able to state citizens. The affected states know first-hand the truth of Chief Justice
Marshall's words that the "power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
78. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
79. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1910) (holding that a state may not be
placed in an inferior status as compared with other states). Consider that other
areas of constitutional law such as the Commerce Clause also contain an element of
equality. Does the burden placed on a few states potentially accord other states a
competitive advantage, for example, with respect to corporate tax policies? Conceiv-
ably, the burdened states might have to raise corporate and individual tax rates to
make up for what the state expends in handling federal policy. This makes the
burdened states less competitive as an area of doing business. If so, the federal
government, itself, is undermining its oft repeated rational for federal intervention:
providing an even playing field for a national market. In such a situation, not only
would the federal government fail to ensure a uniform market, but its own policies
would arbitrarily favor those states not burdened by federal policy; See also
California's Complaint, supra note 20, at 56 (claiming that California is forced to
raise taxes in order to recover what it loses as a result of federal policy).
80. The reason for restricting this analysis to single states or small numbers of
states is because it is these plaintiffs who are least capable of influencing national
policy. This approach does not attempt to negate majoritarian politics, it merely
recognizes the great challenge in following the wishes of the majority, while respect-
ing the rights of the minority. As James Madison warned in a letter to Thomas
Jefferson:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehend-
ed, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents,
but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the
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states. This analysis would seek to protect the disempowered.81
States are not typically thought of as minorities. A leading con-
stitutional scholar, however, recently argued that in certain
instances states might be considered minorities for purposes of
analysis.8' Furthermore, if the states' ability to effect a change
in national policy is the rationale behind screening potential
plaintiffs, it becomes clear that only burdens and not benefits
need be considered in evaluating federal policy.'
One may question the practicality of a direct/indirect
analysis because prior attempts to draw this distinction, in
interstate commerce, have fallen in" and out' of favor. Yet
any proximate cause determination in a tort claim depends upon
an evaluation of directness," and drawing lines is precisely
what courts do.8'
The Constitution contemplates a theory of representative
government, which the Framers embodied in the Guarantee
Clause.S Under the Guarantee Clause, a republican form of
major number of the Constituents."
Quoted in Randy E. Barnett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 21 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
81. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing that the rela-
tive inability of such groups to participate in or to be represented by the political
process is said to justify a judicial role designed to bring about better democracy).
But see G. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 397
(1951) (asserting that public choice theory shows that, in general, "discrete and insu-
lar minorities" are exactly the groups that are likely to obtain disproportionately
large benefits from the political process).
82. See Gatt Implementation Legislation, 1994; Hearings on S.2467 Gatt Imple-
menting Legislation Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1994) (statement of Laurence Tribe); see also
Neuman, supra at note 64.
83. If a few states receive disproportionate benefits from a federal policy, it is
presumably a result that the majority of states approve, or otherwise they would
change the policy.
84. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (defining the scope
of congressional power under the interstate commerce clause depending upon wheth-
er the targeted activity had a direct or indirect impact on interstate commerce); see
also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
85. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (rejecting the direct/indirect
distinction as unworkable).
86. "That which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any ef-
ficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990).
87. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Current Understanding of the Tenth Amendment,
in FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND 154-55 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992).
88. The Constitution's supporters read the Guarantee Clause as an assurance of
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government gives effect to the Framers' representative theory by
yielding, in substance, a responsive government. 9 The Guaran-
tee Clause claims discussed below' do not depend on this
broader concept of a Norm of Equality.9 This essay uses the
Guarantee Clause in the Norm of Equality context to illustrate
that the opportunity for responsive representation is a funda-
mental right,92 a right that must exist equally throughout the
United States.
Given the necessary interaction between federal and state
policies, the federal government action must be consistent and it
must impair, not merely inconvenience, the representative na-
ture of a state's government. The fundamental right to experi-
ence the responsive government embodied in the Guarantee
Clause deserves the protection intended by the Framers."
The requirement that the unequal treatment be consistent
does not rest on an attempt to evaluate the federal government's
intent.94 The focus should be on the extent of the state's impair-
ment. In fact, whether a state's representative capacity is im-
paired will be a function of consistency or duration.95 Addition-
popular, responsive government. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 70 (1972).
89. The Guarantee Clause emphasized the substance as well as the form of
republican government. Id. at 67; see also Debra F. Salz, Discrimination-Prone Ini-
tiatives and the Guarantee Clause: A Role for the Supreme Court, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 100 (1993).
90. The affected states also claim that the federal immigration policy violates
the Guarantee Clause as well as the Tenth Amendment. See Chiles Complaint, supra
note 9, at 33-36; State of Arizona's Compl. at 11-13, Arizona v. U.S., (Dist. Ariz.
1994) (No. 94-0866) [hereinafter Arizona Complaint]; California Complaint, supra
note 20, at 23-25; State of New Jersey's Compl. at 5-11, New Jersey v. U.S., (Dist.
NJ 1994) [hereinafter New Jersey Complaint]; Texas Complaint, supra note 19, at
13-18.
91. In effect, the Norm of Equality Theory says that it may be constitutional
for federal immigration policy to impose such costs on states, but it is unconstitu-
tional to do so in a discriminatory fashion. In contrast the Tenth Amendment and
Guarantee Clause claims discussed infra argue that imposing the costs of federal
immigration policy on states is unconstitutional, even if imposed uniformly.
92. In order to plead such an extraordinary claim to a court, the alleged right
being violated must be fundamental.
93. See supra note 88.
94. Intent in this instance is irrelevant because it is the federal/state relation-
ship, not the federal government's intent in establishing that relationship, that mat-
ters for constitutional analysis.
95. For example, if the federal government jails all the legislators of state X
for one day, the state's representative capacity to respond to its citizens may be
inconvenienced, but not impaired. Incarcerating state X's legislators for one month,
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ally, this test should apply to any and all federal policies that
meet the aforementioned criteria.96
The proposed test is also applicable in the context of evalu-
ating Guarantee Clause claims. Yet, it is unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the federal policy creates disparate impact upon
the states in order to find a Guarantee Clause violation. Since
the Supreme Court has relegated the Guarantee Clause to the
Constitutional dustbin,97 any reliance upon it is suspect. A
court, however, should be willing to entertain the affected states'
Guarantee Clause claims when considered in conjunction with
the unequal treatment the affected states have received. When
one combines an element of inequality with the pernicious
effects of a federal violation of the Guarantee Clause, one can
appreciate the call for judicial relief.
If enforcement of the Guarantee Clause is to be primarily
entrusted to Congress," the strongest justification for judicial
intervention arises where the political process has broken down
and a minority of states are subjected to the tyranny of the
majority. Consistent unequal treatment of a minority of states
by a majority of states is strong evidence that the political pro-
cess has failed. Thus, the equality analysis provides a litmus
test for courts to insure that any intervention is justified.'
In applying the Enhanced Norm of Equality Test to the
however, cripples state X's ability to provide responsive government to those citizens
who take the opportunity to exercise their democratic rights.
96. "Policy" would principally focus on legislation and other congressional enact-
ments, but ought to include Executive Orders, Administrative Agency policies, and
other pronouncements that have the force of law. Theoretically, "policy" should also
include policies of inaction that implicate the Enhanced Norm of Equality Test. See
infra part ll.A.3. The instant cases make this point. Including inaction in "policy" for
cases that are less factually compelling, however, is practically difficult due to the
increase in the scope of judicial review. Still, the legitimacy of the judiciary need not
be undermined, for the alleged inaction must be egregious in order to find a viola-
tion under the Enhanced Norm of Equality Test.
97. See WIECEK supra note 88, at 247-289. But see New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct.
2408, 2432-33 (1992) (Justice O'Connor may have signalled a willingness to entertain
Guarantee Clause claims. Justice O'Connor found that the justiciability of Guarantee
Clause claims was not a settled issue); see also Salz, supra note 89.
98. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that Guarantee
Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions).
99. Professor John Hart Ely expounds such a process-oriented construct in his
representation-reinforcing approach. "Rather than dictate substantive results it [the
Judiciary] intervenes only when the 'market,' in our case the political market, is sys-
tematically malfunctioning." ELY, supra note 81, at 102-03.
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federal government's immigration policy, it is apparent that
federal policy is responsible for the substantial costs imposed on
the affected states.' Furthermore, the federal government has
consistently carried out a policy of lax border patrols'' that
reflects a lack of concern, rather than an inability to control the
problem.102 Additionally, the affected states are in a minority
position vis-a-vis national policy, unable to effect funding legisla-
tion that appropriately provides relief.' Lastly, the federal
immigration policy has impaired the representative capacity of
the affected states,0 4 especially those operating under state
balanced budget amendments who cannot adopt the federal
practice of deficit-spending.0 5
On balance, however, the affected states' reliance on a Norm
of Equality Theory is problematic. Beyond the judicial tradition
of not deciding constitutional issues where the case can be dis-
posed of alternatively,"6 the Norm of Equality Theory impli-
cates many of the political question factors set forth in Baker v.
100. Incarceration costs are probably most strongly linked to the federal
government's immigration policy. See Hr'g Mot. Dismiss at 38, Chiles v. United
States (S.D. Fla 1994) (No. 94-0676) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit decision in
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989), holding that Dade County's
police response to rioting illegal aliens was caused, for standing purposes, by the
federal policy that allowed the illegal aliens into Florida. Therefore, the federal poli-
cy directly caused Florida's incarceration costs.
101. See Chiles Complaint, supra note 9, at 14 (citing former Attorney General
William French Smith's 1981 statement that "[W]e have lost control of our borders.
We have pursued unrealistic policies. We have failed to enforce our laws effective-
ly."). See also Attorney General Janet Reno's remarks that Congress is drafting bud-
get and legislative packages "that will help us continue to reverse the failed immi-
gration policies and practices of the past." Special White House Briefing: Immigration
Initiative, FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File.
102. See Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, Justice Department Weekly
Media Availability, FED. NEWS SERV., Oct. 13, 1994 (describing how increased efforts
at controlling portions of the Southwestern border known as "Operation Hold the
Line" have been very successful at severely reducing the rate of illegal immigrants
crossing into California).
103. See supra note 12 (documenting the affected states' inability to get mean-
ingful relief from Congress). Congress has authorized that some monies be distribut-
ed to the states, but the authorization falls woefully short of providing the affected
states appropriate relief.
104. See Texas Complaint, supra note 19, at 13; New Jersey Complaint, supra
note 90, at 6.
105. See Arizona Complaint, supra note 90, at 11; see also New Jersey Com-
plaint, supra note 90, at 11 ("In New Jersey, the State Constitution prohibits deficit
spending.").
106. A court may decide the affected states' lawsuits on statutory grounds.
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Carr.107 Furthermore, a decision based on a Norm of Equality
Theory might be too sweeping in its precedential impact,05
even if a court gives a narrow holding. Conversely, a decision on
Tenth Amendment grounds or a specific statutory duty would be
more limited in scope.
B. Principles of Federalism Inherent in the Tenth
Amendment and the Guarantee Clause
The crux of the affected states' complaints is that the feder-
al government's poor enforcement of the immigration laws al-
lows massive numbers of illegal immigrants into those states,
resulting in substantial costs.'" The affected states argue that
these costs strain their resources to the point where the state
legislative processes are unconstitutionally commandeered, and
political accountability is undermined.'
The affected states' focus on illegal immigration, however, is
somewhat of a red herring. To the extent that the affected states
rely on the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause as a
basis for relief, the legal/illegal immigration distinction is imma-
terial."' For example, assume the federal government enacted
107. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Potential areas of attack are a "lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards, or the impossibility of a court deciding the
issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion." Id. at 217. It is important to note that the potential non-justiciability of the
Norm of Equality Theory does not affect a court's analysis of the affected states'
claims on other constitutional or statutory grounds.
108. Contra Chiles Reply, supra note 19, at 43 (arguing that a decision favorable
to the states will have limited precedential value).
109. See New Jersey Complaint, supra note 90, at 12; Chiles Complaint, supra
note 9, at 14-23; Texas Complaint, supra note 19, at 12-13; California Complaint,
supra note 20, at 1-2; Arizona Complaint, supra note 90, at 8-9.
110. Five states: Florida, California, Texas, New Jersey, and Arizona contend
that federal immigration policy, as carried out, violates (1) the Tenth Amendment
which provides: "[Tlhe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people," U.S. CONST. amend. X; and (2) the Guarantee Clause: "[Tihe United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
111. The affected states' costs for incarceration and education are not currently
eligible for federal reimbursement. Assuming it costs states the same to incarcerate
and educate legal as well as illegal immigrants, the legal/illegal distinction is irrele-
vant. See infra note 120. For constitutional purposes, the legal/illegal immigration
distinction is only important because the federal government does not reimburse the
states for the emergency medical care they are required to provide to illegal immi-
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a new immigration policy of accepting all immigrants. The af-
fected states' Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause argu-
ments would remain viable because their reliance on New York
v. US. derives from the reasoning in that case that comman-
deering state legislatures undermines political accountabili-
ty."' The potential commandeering of a state's legislative ap-
paratus due to federal immigration policy depends upon the
immigration-related costs imposed on the state."' These costs
will be the same irrespective of whether the immigrants are
legal or illegal." 4
The affected states' claims are justified by the federal
government's plenary power over immigration policy." 5 The
states argue that the federal government cannot constitutionally
impose the costs of federal policy on the states. Some might
contend that if the legal/illegal distinction does not matter, the
affected states' Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause claims
can be reduced to the following proposition: The federal govern-
ment has an obligation to reimburse the states for costs result-
ing from artificial increases " ' in state population. For in-
stance, if the federal government adopted a completely open
immigration policy, the states would be swollen with legal in-
stead of illegal immigrants. The costs or benefits of immigration
grants. See URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 10, at 107-108. The Federal Gov-
ernment does, however, partially reimburse the states for the cost of providing emer-
gency medical care to legal immigrants. Id. at 108.
112. See New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
113. The likelihood that a state's legislative processes will be commandeered is
directly related to the costs imposed on the state. Determining the point at which
costs imposed on a state effectively operate to commandeer its legislative apparatus
is case-specific and, admittedly, difficult. For example, state A, if wealthier than
state B, may have a higher commandeering threshhold. Thus, the same costs im-
posed upon A and B may commandeer B's legislative machinery, but not A's. States
making such a Tenth Amendment claim would carry a heavy burden indeed, because
a court, in an effort to combat charges of judicial overreaching, would require a
strong showing that the state's legislative apparatus is commandeered. A closely
related point concerns the impairment to a state's representative capacity/republican
form of government that results from substantial cost impositions. See supra notes
102-103, and accompanying text. Thus, the federal imposition of unduly burdensome
costs on states may violate either the Guarantee Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or
both.
114. See supra note 111.
115. See supra notes 6-7.
116. I use "artificial" to mean a level substantially higher than the rate of in-
crease attributable to births minus deaths, plus the net effects of the migration of
residents from other states.
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aside,"' one might argue that the imposition of 50,000 legal
immigrants on a state is analogous to a situation where 50,000
New Yorkers moved en masse to Florida.
Yet such an argument misses the mark. While it is true that
the costs imposed upon the affected states might be substantial-
ly the same,"' the federal government does not possess plena-
ry power over interstate migration as it does over immigra-
tion. "'19 The affected states' Tenth Amendment and Guarantee
Clause claims are applicable, regardless of the legal/illegal dis-
tinction,"' precisely because immigration policy is exclusively
a federal policy. The federal immigration policy is constitutional-
ly suspect because in our federal system the states are not to be
reduced to servants, "directed to enact or administer"'' a fed-
eral program.
The legal/illegal immigration distinction, however, is impor-
tant to the other claims made by the affected states. For exam-
ple, the affected states allege that the federal government has
failed to perform its duties under federal statutes that apply
specifically to illegal immigration.'22
The gravamen of the affected states' arguments is their
contention that federal immigration policy violates the Tenth
Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. Examining the Tenth
Amendment argument first, the affected states rely heavily on
the Supreme Court's most recent Tenth Amendment interpreta-
117. See generally JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRA-
TION 337-46 (1989) (discussing the economic and social costs and benefits of legal
and illegal immigrants).
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 6-7 (tracing the federal government's plenary power over
immigration).
120. This essay has argued that the affected states' constitutional claims do not
depend on the legal/illegal immigration distinction itself. See supra note 111. The
states challenge the constitutionality of incurring substantial nonreimbursed costs re-
sulting from federal policy. If the federal government partially reimbursed the affect-
ed states for the cost of providing emergency medical care to illegal immigrants, and
the costs for incarcerating and educating immigrants, legal or illegal, presumably the
affected states would be satisfied. Thus, only to the extent that the affected states'
costs vary, according to the legality of the immigration, is the legal/illegal distinction
relevant. Even if the costs to the states for legal and illegal immigration are equiva-
lent, the affected states may challenge these costs under the Tenth Amendment or
the Guarantee Clause. See the Enhanced Norm of Equality Test, supra section ILA.3.
121. New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2434-35 (1992).
122. See, e.g., California's claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and 1326, infra part
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tion in New York v. U.S.'23 The Court in New York invalidated
on Tenth Amendment grounds the "take title" provision of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985.124 Under the take title provision, states failing federal
standards for the disposal of low level radioactive waste must
assume ownership of such waste and all liabilities attached to
it.
125
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor invalidat-
ed the take title arrangement on the basis that it "'commandeers
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,' an
outcome that has never been understood to lie within the au-
thority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution."
126
Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York principally rests on
two grounds: the first is the Framers' conception of the proper
structure of federal-state relations,'27 while the second regards
123. 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992). This decision did not expressly overturn the leading
case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Consequently, there has been some division over the proper weight to be accorded
New York. At least one district court, in interpreting New York, declared part of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993)
[hereinafter Brady Bill] unconstitutional. It reasoned that New York and prior Tenth
Amendment cases form a continuum against which the facts of each case must be
compared in determining which precedent appropriately controls. Compare Koog v.
United States, 852 F.Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994) and Printz v. U.S., 854 F.Supp.
1503 (D. Mon. 1994).
124. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2434.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2Xc).
126. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2421 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
127. 112 S.Ct. at 2421. This position is most fully articulated in O'Connor's con-
currence in FERC v. Mississippi:
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the
national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks to which Congress may
assign problems for extended study. Instead, each State is sovereign
within its own domain, governing its citizens and providing for their
general welfare. While the Constitution and federal statutes define the
boundaries of that domain, they do not harness state power for national
purposes.
456 U.S. 742, 777 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). See also Powell, The Oldest Question at 675-681; RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987). But see John C. Hueston, Altering the
Course of the Constitutional Convention: The Role of the Committee of Detail in Es-
tablishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765 (1990) (argu-
ing that the Framers did not choose the federal model set forth in the Constitution,
but instead were forced to compromise). He asserts that the Framers debated and
initially approved a model which vested more power in the national government,
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political accountability. 2 " On the first point, O'Connor found
that the Framers considered and ultimately rejected a system
where Congress would pass laws operating on the states, instead
of directly on individuals."
The stronger of Justice O'Connor's reasons is the second
argument concerning political accountability,"0 although it is
treated as less important.'3 ' Legislation like the take title pro-
vision, which applies only to states, allows federal decision-mak-
ers to make policy while remaining hidden from view, leaving
state officials exposed to the public's wrath.' Where the feder-
al government compels states to regulate, it diminishes the
but, due to the length of the Constitutional Convention, approved a weaker federal
model drafted by the Committee of Detail.
128. Id. at 2420-22.
129. Id. at 2421. Although Justice O'Connor cites the Framers' rejection of this
federal-state structure, the underlying reason for such a rejection was to create a
stronger central government to avoid the decentralization problem that incapacitated
the Articles of Confederation. Thus the Framers were not rejecting that method of
governance to protect the states or the people, but rather to form a stronger central
government. However, exactly why the Framers chose to reject Congress legislating
upon the states in their sovereign capacities rather than upon the people directly, is
difficult to know due to the problems in ascertaining the Framers' intent. See gen-
erally Hueston, supra note 127.
130. Some believe Justice O'Connor's discussion of the intended federal-state
structure is a red herring. See Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An
Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History and Policy in Determining the
Scope of Federal Power, 41 KAN. L. REV. 493 (1993). Proponents of this belief decry
Justice O'Connor's appeal to the Framer's intent regarding the "proper" federal-state
structure as an attempt to impose anachronistic ideas of federalism on a modern
republic. Often explicit in these attacks is the notion that original intent is an ile-
gitimate basis for constitutional adjudication. However, some of our leading constitu-
tional scholars strongly support the use of original intent. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 264-65 (1989); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989) (acknowledging the weakness of originalism but concluding
that it is superior to any other judicial method). Justice O'Connor's reliance on the
importance of the Framer's intent likely extends beyond the Constitutional Conven-
tion. See generally W. ANDERSON, THE NATION AND THE STATES, RIVAiS OR PART-
NERS? 86-87 (noting that the first Congress rejected proposals to rely upon state
officials to enforce federal law and suggesting that this decision to leave the states
free to work out and to concentrate their attention and resources upon their own
functions has become part of our constitutional understanding). This argument im-
plants the Framers' intentions into our constitutional jurisprudence, providing greater
force for Justice O'Connor's reliance.
131. New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992). "Our task would be the
same even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It
consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding
and applying the framework set forth in the Constitution." Id.
132. Id. at 2420.
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accountability of both state and federal officials. "3'
For example, if the citizens of Florida do not consider a
certain state policy to be in their best interests, they may elect
state officials who share their view. The resulting state legisla-
tion can be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if it is con-
trary to the national view and within the federal government's
competence. In such a case, it is the federal government that
acts in the public view, and it will be federal officials who suffer
the consequences if the decision proves unpopular.
Conversely, consider a situation where the federal govern-
ment directs the states to implement federal policy. The state
officials, apparently acting in their state capacity, bear the brunt
of any public disapproval while the federal officials, who are
responsible for the program, remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their policy choices. Accountability and respon-
siveness are diminished when federal coercion, rather than local
political pressure, controls the actions of state officials on mat-
ters not pre-empted by federal legislation." Such a situation
presents obvious dangers because diminished accountability
threatens democracy. " New York, unfortunately, does not pro-
vide answers to some of the most critical questions concerning
the cases at hand.
Probably the most important question concerns the defini-
tion of "commandeer." At what point can a state argue that its
legislative prerogatives have been commandeered? Must a state
legislature be required to act in compliance with a federal stat-
ute, or can significant restrictions imposed upon its legislative
choices, as a result of federal policy, constitute commandeering?
Does the New York analysis apply only to federal legislation or
is federal action or inaction a proper area of review? All of these
questions can be reduced to: can New York v. U.S. be applied to
the affected states' challenges to federal immigration policy? 3 '
133. See Powell, supra note 127, at 686-87, notes 253-257 and accompanying
text.
134. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2424. See also Powell, supra note 127, at 686-687,
note 256 and accompanying text.
135. A system lacking accountability becomes "undemocratic... in the quite
obvious sense that by refusing to legislate, our legislators are escaping the sort of
accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic."
ELY, supra note 81, at 132.
136. Inextricably tied to this question is the issue of whether New York should
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It is useful here to consider how courts have since applied New
York.
Most recently, four of five federal district courts, relying on
New York v. U.S., struck down part of the Brady Bill.137 The
challenged provision of the Brady Bill requires the Chief Law
Enforcement Officer ("CLEO") in a locale to conduct a back-
ground check on any person seeking to purchase a handgun.1"
Although the CLEO has discretion over the thoroughness of the
background check, depending on the circumstances, the CLEO is
assigned the obligation of performing a check in some capaci-
ty. 139
The federal district courts held that this provision of the
Brady Bill violates the Tenth Amendment because it substan-
tially commandeers state executive officers and indirectly com-
mandeers state legislative processes in administering a federal
program.14 Importantly, one court read New York as not only
be applied in the immigration context. Whether New York is applicable and whether
the affected states' Tenth Amendment claims are justiciable are issues closely depen-
dent upon one another. For example, a court may decide that the "commandeer" test
established by New York cannot be applied in any principled way to these cases. In
the absence of establishing a new Tenth Amendment standard, a court may conclude
that the affected states' lawsuits for Tenth Amendment purposes are nonjusticiable,
due to a lack of judicially manageable standards. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). To the extent practicable, this essay attempts to analyze these issues sepa-
rately.
137. See Brady Bill, supra note 123. See also McGee v. U.S., 863 F.Supp. 321
(S.D. Miss. 1994); Printz v. U.S., 854 F.Supp. 1503 (D. Mon. 1994); Frank v. U.S.,
860 F.Supp. 1030 (D.Vt. 1994); Mack v. U.S., 856 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz. 1994). Com-
pare Koog v. U.S., 852 F.Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (upholding the challenged
Brady Bill provision).
138. See Brady Bill, supra note 123, at § 102(a)(2).
139. For example, if the CLEO knows the potential gun purchaser personally,
the CLEO has the discretion to determine that a background check is unnecessary.
However, the possibility that the CLEO will not have to conduct a background check
does not discharge his or her duty under the Brady Bill to decide initially whether
a check is necessary.
140. The court in Printz explained:
[Tihey [local governments] are faced with the choice of forcing the CLEOs
to divert resources from another area of operation, diverting resources
from another budget area into each CLEO's department budget, or in-
creasing the CLEO's department budgets through raising taxes. As a
result, local citizens will receive fewer services from each of the chief law
enforcement officer's departments, fewer services from other agencies, or
higher state and local taxes. Indirectly commandeering the legislative
processes of the states in this way may lead to the perception among
voters that state and local government have become less efficient and
responsive to their needs.
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prohibiting federal compulsion of states to enact a federal regu-
latory program, but also as prohibiting the administration of
such a program.14 ' Another court described New York's holding
as broadly applicable, extending to cases where federal law does
not require the state to legislate, but merely requires it to ex-
pend time and resources toward implementation of the federal
act.
42
Despite the overwhelming invalidation of the Brady Bill
provision by the federal district courts, Robert Yates' remarks in
the constitutional debates support the proposition that New York
v. U.S. is inappropriately used to strike down the Brady Bill
provision.' Assuming, arguendo, that these district courts
854 F. Supp., at 1515. Accordingly, members of these elected bodies may be held ac-
countable. The federal government will not suffer any financial responsibility either.
141. See Printz v. U.S., 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (1994).
142. See Mack v. U.S., 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz. 1994). The affected states'
lawsuits are conceptually similar to this situation, except that the states are re-
quired to expend time and resources as a result of mis-implementation of a federal
policy.
143. One might argue that New York does not support judicial invalidation of
the Brady Bill provision. New York's application to the Brady Bill provision calls
into question any federal/state cooperative efforts where state officers are required to
act in compliance with federal law (e.g., state reporting of crime statistics to the
FBI for compilation of national figures). Invalidating such federal/state arrangements
might, in practice, prove politically unpopular and administratively problematic. The
Brady Bill is an example of cooperation between the federal government and the
states that had overwhelming political support. In fact, more than 90% of the Ameri-
can public supported the Brady Bill's passage. See Karen Tumulty, Brady Bill Clears
Logjam in the Senate for Final Approval Legislation: Clinton Gets Compromise Ver-
sion of Gun-Control Measure after GOP Drops Politically Damaging Filibuster. Con-
gress Recesses for the Year, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1993, at Al. Such public support is
important to some commentators who argue that public opinion is a legitimate inter-
pretive factor that ought to influence many constitutional decisions. See James G.
Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1037, 1104-25 (1993).
Additionally, the Brady Bill was enacted by a Congress sensitive to the con-
cerns of federalism. Congress and the states had worked together to produce what
they thought was a constitutional arrangement. See H.R. REP. No. 344, 103rd Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1993). In support of the weight to accord congressional interpretation of
the Constitution, consider the remarks of Robert Yates, an influential voice in the
constitutional debates:
Had the construction of the constitution been left with the legislature,
they would have explained it at their peril... [A] constitution is a com-
pact of a people with their rulers; if the rulers break the compact, the
people have a right and ought to remove them, and do themselves jus-
tice; but in order to enable them to do this with the greater facility,
those whom the people chuse at stated periods, should have the power in
the last resort to determine the sense of the compact; if they determine
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correctly applied New York to invalidate the Brady Bill provi-
sion, one must still determine whether the affected states' immi-
gration lawsuits are sufficiently analogous to warrant the same
results.
A facial comparison of the affected states' lawsuits and the
Brady Bill cases reveal a number of differences. The Brady Bill
provision is a federal statute that requires compliance by state
and local actors for its execution. In contrast, the affected states'
lawsuits involve the ineffective enforcement of federal law by the
Executive,' as well as a congressional failure to fulfill a con-
stitutional and statutory duty to reimburse the affected
states.'45 Thus, the Brady Bill provision explicitly requires
affirmative state action, whereas the federal immigration policy
ostensibly requires nothing of the states.146 Furthermore, the
contrary to the understanding of the people, an appeal will lie to the
people at the period when the rulers are to be elected, and they will
have it in their power to remedy the evil; but when this power is lodged
in the hands of men independent of the people, and of their represen-
tatives, and who are not, constitutionally, accountable for their opinions,
no way is left to controul them but with a high hand and an out-
stretched arm.
ROBERT YATES, THE LETTERS OF BRUTUS (1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS
350, 357 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1985) (emphasis in original). Thus, one may argue
that the judiciary should not employ overly formalistic notions of federalism (a con-
cept of dubious constitutional importance) to override federal/state cooperative efforts
that are functionally important and politically popular.
These objections to invalidating the Brady Bill under New York, however, are
misguided. While public support may make certain legislation easier to pass, it does
not make legislation constitutional. Justice Jackson noted public opinion's irrelevance
to constitutional adjudication when he stated: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The notion that politically popular legislation is
beyond the reach of judicial review is indefensible. As Chief Justice Marshall stated
in Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Furthermore, the under-
lying assumption of these objections is that federalism is not worthy of judicial en-
forcement. This illustrates a substantive judgment about federalism that is contrary
to Justice O'Connor's position in New York which states: "[T]he Constitution protects
us from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among
branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concen-
trate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day." New
York v. U.S., 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434.
144. See Chiles Complaint, supra note 9, at 26-30 (alleging that the Attorney
General abused her discretion).
145. Id. at 30-36.
146. It is this aspect of the affected states' suits. that most diminishes their
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Brady Bill cases involve a federal statute that imposes easily
determinable costs upon states, but the immigration cases in-
volve costs resulting from dereliction of federal policy; costs that
are not as readily identifiable or agreed upon.47
Despite these differences, the same justifications behind
New York support these immigration cases: a lack of political
accountability, and violation of the essential structure of federal-
state relations.14 Under either the Brady Bill provision or the
federal immigration policy, the affected states suffer the same
fate, aptly described by New Jersey in its complaint: the federal
government's failure to enforce the immigration laws results in
costs imposed upon New Jersey that commandeer its "scarce
state resources for implementation of federal policy choices and
prerogatives rather than state objectives." 49
Assuming New York applies, does federal immigration policy
commandeer the affected states' governments? The Brady Bill
cases found that even the relatively small costs imposed on
states and localities in complying with the law were not de mini-
mis." The Brady Bill provision, however, explicitly assigned a
state officer (CLEO) the task of implementing federal law,
whereas federal immigration policy does not.
According to Justice O'Connor's prior opinions, a state need
not be explicitly directed to act in order to be comman-
deered.' 5 ' Justice O'Connor's conception of the meaning of com-
mandeer, as stated in FERC v. Mississippi, extends beyond any
chances of success. Precisely because federal immigration policy, as written, requires
nothing of states, the federal government can claim that the states could not possi-
bly have been commandeered under New York. The states are not legally obligated
to either legislate or implement a federal program. This position aptly illustrates the
competing perspectives urged upon the courts: the federal government wants to ana-
lyze federal immigration policy as written, while the affected states focus on immi-
gration policy as applied.
147. See e.g., the URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 10, at 129 (providing
discrepancies between its calculation of costs and those claimed by the states).
148. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2432.
149. New Jersey Complaint, supra note 90, at 5.
150. The de Minimis analysis established by Justice Rehnquist in South Carolina
v. Baker, states that where the federal imposition on a state's sovereignty is very
slight, it does not violate the Tenth Amendment. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
151. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in FERC v. Mississippi argued to invalidate
federal policies which "absorbed state resources in the consideration of federal con-
cerns and in adherence to federal procedures." 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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formal requirements. In fact, O'Connor found that the imposition
of a congressional agenda on state institutions "drains the inven-
tive energy of state governmental bodies" by commandeering
scarce resources of time, attention and public concern, making a
state "less able to pursue local proposals."'
Federal immigration policy surely falls within Justice
O'Connor's definition of commandeer. The federal policy operates
to impose Congress' agenda on the affected states. In this in-
stance Congress' agenda is not an affirmative legislative pro-
gram, but a policy of indifference. This agenda dumps Congress'
failure to adequately control illegal immigration on the affected
states. Unfortunately, the affected states may not simply ignore
the illegal immigration problem as Congress has.'53  The
costs" of illegal immigration imposed upon the affected states
absorb "state and local revenue-the life-blood of local autono-
my,"15 thereby commandeering the state and local govern-
ments.
The affected states' complaints additionally assert that the
federal immigration policy violates the Guarantee Clause.15
152. Id.
153. See Chiles Complaint, supra note 9, at 18-20 (arguing that the affected
states are compelled to pay the cost of the federal abdication and default policy); see
also supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the affected states' lack of
choice in assuming the costs thrust upon them as a result of federal immigration
policy).
154. URBAN INSTITtE REPORT, see supra note 10, commissioned by the federal
government itself documents the staggering costs the affected states must absorb in
dealing with the illegal immigration problem. However, the position that cost imposi-
tions are dispositive in proving a Tenth Amendment violation is undercut to the
extent that the Brady Bill cases relied on the affirmative duty placed on the CLEO,
rather than the money or resources expended. Still, the substantial numbers of ille-
gal immigrants allowed into the affected states impose both constitutional and prac-
tical obligations on the states.
155. Hans Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State, WASH. L.
REV. VOL. 39, No. 4, 117-118 (1964).
156. See supra note 90. The Guarantee Clause claims are so intertwined in the
states' Tenth Amendment arguments previously set out, see supra text accompanying
notes 109-22, that I will only touch upon the origins of the clause to avoid redun-
dancy. The affected states also rely on the "invasion clause" within the Guarantee
Clause. This little known clause provides that the United States "shall protect each
of them [states] against Invasion." U.S. CONST, art., IV § 4. Florida and California
claim that the illegal immigrants flooding into their states constitute an invasion,
against which the federal government has failed to protect. The federal government
ably refutes this assertion arguing that the Framers meant armed invasion when
they drafted the clause. The federal government supports its position by citing Arti-
cle I § 8, clause 15: "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute Laws of the
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"The sine qua non of a republican form of government is the
political accountability of elected officials to the citizens."57
The states allege that the money they spend on illegal immi-
grants reduces the pool of funds available in allocating resources
pursuant to the state electorate's needs.15 The states thus
argue that this vote dilution violates the Guarantee Clause. As
previously noted, however, the Supreme Court has been content
to let the "sleeping giant" lie."5 9
The Court's reluctance to apply the Guarantee Clause does
not reflect the importance given to it by the Framers."6 In-
deed, the Framers regarded this clause as essential to permit
the federal government to both suppress insurrections in the
states and to guarantee that states maintained a republican
form of government. 6' Though some thought it would prove
meaningless,'62 the Framers intended the Guarantee Clause to
protect the form of republican government as well as the sub-
stance." The Framers believed that the substance of republi-
can government was the assurance of "popular responsive gov-
ernment."1"
The affected states allege the very violation that the Guar-
antee Clause was intended to protect: the undermining of the
republican form of government within the states. The states
claim that federal immigration policy has weakened the republi-
can nature of the states by impairing their ability to provide
popular responsive government.'" Does this mean that the af-
fected states no longer have republican governments? Probably
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." Government's Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 19, at 35-36.
157. Texas Complaint, supra note 20, at 15.
158. A situation which is particularly acute for the affected states, who must
comply with state constitutional balanced budget amendments.
159. See WIECEK, supra note 88, at 67 (noting the Supreme Court's position that
Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable).
160. "There is not another in the whole instrument more important; or, on the
right understanding of which, the success and duration of our political system more
depend." John C. Calhoun in WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 134 (1972).
161. Id at 4.
162. Id. at 71
163. Id. at 67. See also supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
164. Id at 68.
165. See New Jersey Complaint, supra note 90, at 14; Chiles Complaint, supra
note 9, at 33-36; Texas Complaint, supra note 19, at 15-18; California Complaint,
supra note 20, at 8-11; Arizona Complaint, supra note 90, at 12-14.
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not. If the Framers intended the Clause, however, to protect the
substance as well as the form of republican government, perhaps
the affected states' claims may best be understood as an argu-
ment that federal immigration policy has so fundamentally im-
paired the purpose and advantages of republican government,
that the form as it exists in these states is merely a hollow shell.
Yet, it is doubtful that a court will "enter this political thick-
et,"" notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refinement of the
political question doctrine.'67
C. Statutory Claims
In general," the affected states allege that the Attorney
General has abused her discretion by failing to promulgate stan-
dards and disburse funds under the Immigration Reform and
Control Act" and to reimburse states for the cost of incarcer-
ating illegal aliens.
III. WHETHER A COURT CAN PROVIDE A REMEDY?
This question likely poses the greatest obstacle to the affect-
ed states' success. As will be discussed, a court may follow the
federal government's reminder that "the Constitution does not
166. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
167. See generally Salz, supra note 89 (arguing that Justice Brennan's develop-
ment of political question factors in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961), narrowed
the political question doctrine, making it easier for a court to read substance into
the Guarantee Clause).
168. An in-depth treatment of the affected states' statutory claims is beyond the
scope of this paper. The statutory claims are secondary in importance to the states'
constitutional claims. They are more helpful in affirming the federal government's
responsibility over immigration, than in showing how that responsibility translates
into an enforceable duty.
169. Pub. L. 99-603, § 113, 100 Stat. 3359 (establishing an "Immigration Emer-
gency Fund", and authorizing the disbursement of funds upon the President's deter-
mination that an immigration emergency existed). The law also provided for an
annual appropriation of $35 million to be used to reimburse state and local govern-
ments dealing with an immigration emergency). Pub. L. 101-649, § 705, 104 Stat.
5087 (authorizing the AG to disburse up to $20 million to the states without the
president's declaration of an immigration emergency). Pub. L. 102-140, Title VI, §
610, 105 Stat. 832. (requiring the AG to promulgate regulations for the disbursement
of this money). Congress further authorized the appropriation of such sums as neces-
sary to reimburse the states for costs "incurred by the state for the imprisonment of
any illegal alien.. . who is convicted of a felony by such State." 8 U.S.C. § 1365.
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provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill." 70
A. Justiciability
Assuming that a court finds that the federal immigration
policy, as carried out, violates the Constitution, the court must
determine whether it should provide relief.17' This decision di-
rectly implicates the integrity of the judiciary. 172
The affected states argue that their challenge to federal
immigration policy does not present a political question. 1
They concede that the federal government's failure to enforce
immigration policy is a "crisis with profound political dimen-
sions, " 17' but note that "not every matter touching on politics is
a political question."7 ' The federal government counters that
the affected states do not assert any judicially manageable stan-
dard by which a court can judge their claims. 7 Two initial
federal district court rulings agree.7 '
170. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
171. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1549 (noting that non-justiciability does not
foreclose a court's consideration of the claim. "[R]ather, the Court's inquiry necessari-
ly proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially
identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right
asserted can be judicially molded." (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)).
172. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). "We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution." Id.
173. See Chiles Reply, supra note 19, at 4-12.
174. Id. at 4.
175. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2865
(1986) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962)).
176. See Government's Memorandum, supra note 25, at 2.
177. Two federal district courts have dismissed the complaints filed by Florida
and California. See Order on Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment,
Chiles v. U.S., 874 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla 1994), motion granted [hereinafter
Government's Judgment]; Nancy Cleeland, State's Suit over Illegal Immigration Dis-
missed, SAN DIEGo UNION-TRI., Feb. 14, 1995, at Al. Both courts cited several
reasons for dismissal, the most prevalent being that the states' challenges involved a
nonjusticiable political question.
In order to grant the restitution requested by Plaintiffs [Florida], the
Court would be forced to review the United States entire enforcement of
Federal immigration laws, including the enforcement methods used and
their effectiveness, determine the reasonableness of budget allocations,
determine whether more resources are available and, if so, decide how
those additional resources should be allocated. The Court is unable to
identify satisfactory criteria for making these determinations. This is
clearly beyond the Judiciary's authority, and should be left to the Legis-
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The states do not argue, and a court cannot articulate, a
precise mathematical standard to evaluate a state's claim. None-
theless, the lack of an exacting judicial standard did not prevent
the Supreme Court from ordering redistricting in Baker v.
Carr.17 As Baker illustrates, courts that are committed to re-
solving disputes can and will use "fuzzy" standards. In these
cases, the affected states liken a court's ability to discern a con-
stitutional violation to the amorphous standards used to deter-
mine when governmental regulation of private property consti-
tutes a "taking" for Fifth Amendment purposes.1 9
Interestingly, the federal government has not argued that
the affected states' suits implicate foreign affairs. The Supreme
Court has held that immigration implicates foreign affairs,"s
and has granted the federal government more leeway in matters
touching on foreign policy. 1' Accordingly, one would expect the
federal government to assert these arguments to bolster its
claim that these suits present a non-justiciable political
question.
B. Relief
The affected states seek an injunction requiring the federal
government to make payments under statutes mandating finan-
lative and Executive branches of government.
Government's Judgment, at 1344.
178. 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)
179. Interview with Carol Licko, Special Assistant Attorney General, State of
Florida (Oct. 6, 1994).
180. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (placing immigration policy within
Congress's broad foreign affairs prerogative); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immi-
gration Law and Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 6 SuP. CT. REV. 255
(1984). Cf, Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1984) (arguing that foreign policy and national security concerns are not
responsible for courts' reluctance to adjudicate immigration claims). Instead, Schuck
contends that the association between immigration law and national sovereignty lies
at the heart of judicial deference. "The idea of sovereignty .... [is compelling]
when a unified national government deploys its laws against one who is plausibly
seen as an outsider - as, quite literally, [an] alien . .. ." Id. at 17.
181. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 281, note 1 § 5-16 (1978). Contra Ann-
Marie Slaughter Burley, Book Review: Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1980 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL AN-
SWERS: DOES THE RuLE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)) (arguing that
judicial review should extend equally to foreign and domestic affairs).
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cial assistance, 2  and equitable restitution." The affected
states' request -that the court enjoin the federal government to
enforce its immigration laws- is the broadest and least likely
relief to be granted." The federal government asserts that
this request effectively asks a court to supervise the enforcement
of federal immigration laws.
Lastly, the affected states request an injunction to require
the federal government to fulfill its constitutional obligation by
providing the states with financial assistance. The affected
states seek to recover the amounts they have paid and are likely
182. Authorized by Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988). The authority
to review agency action derives from the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
702 and 706. Florida, New Jersey and Arizona request that the Attorney General
promulgate standards and release funds pursuant to Pub. L. No. 102-140, Tit. VI, §
610, 105 Stat. 832 and Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 705, 104 Stat. 5087. See supra note
20 for an explanation of these statutes. Arizona, New Jersey and California further
request that the Attorney General and the Commissioner and Director of the OMB
be enjoined to take all necessary action to reimburse the states for all their incar-
ceration costs. This relief goes beyond the $20 million that the Attorney General is
authorized to release annually without Presidential declaration of an immigration
emergency. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 705, 104 Stat. 5087. Arizona, New Jersey and
California rely on Public Law 103-121 which provides an appropriation from the U.S.
Treasury to the Attorney General of $1,048,538,000 for expenses necessary to the
administration and enforcement of laws relating to the immigration, naturalization
and alien registration. Finally, since Florida's request for relief is more comprehen-
sive than either New Jersey or Arizona (not California), it is unclear from which
appropriation Florida seeks its reimbursement (other than Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 113,
100 Stat. 3359, establishing an "Immigration Emergency Fund", and the Medicaid
and AFDC programs). The federal government contends that this request is now
moot because of 59 Fed. Reg. 30,520 (1994) promulgating rules for implementation of
Emergency Fund Act. Although the federal government has released some money to
the states to help pay for incarceration costs, it is less than the amount requested.
183. The states attempt to characterize the monetary relief they seek as equita-
ble restitution rather than damages in order to avoid the federal government's de-
fense of sovereign immunity. The amount requested is substantial and is broken
down as follows: Florida: $1 billion; See Bob Knotts, Lisa Ocker and Michael E.
Young, Legal Immigration Earns Forum Praise, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 1994, at IA;
New Jersey: $1.05 billion; see New Jersey Complaint, supra note 90, at 8; Texas: $5
billion, Heather Ann Hope, Who Gets the Bill for Illegal Immigrants? In the End,
Supreme Court may Decide, BOND BUYER, Sept. 9, 1994, at 1; Arizona: $121 million,
Jeff Barker, State Overestimated Number of Inmate Illegals, Study Says, ARIZONA
REPuBuc, Sept. 9, 1994, at BI; California: $8.65 billion, California Complaint, supra
note 20, at 11.
184. The affected states admit that this is probably beyond the power of a court,
since it involves the court in matters relating to the conduct and foreign relations
and the deployment of the military forces of the U.S. See Chiles Complaint, supra
note 9, at 6. California also seeks an injunction mandating that the INS Commis-
sioner initiate deportation proceedings against illegal immigrants deportable under
federal law. See California Complaint, supra note 20, at 43.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
to pay as a result of the failed federal immigration policy. The
federal government argues that neither the Guarantee Clause,
nor the Tenth Amendment provide any justiciable standard for
such a claim. The federal government further contends that the
states are not guaranteed by the Constitution an allotment of a
given amount of dollars to spend as they wish. It argues that
this case is a matter of degree, and that there is no principled
way to determine at what point, if any, the states are comman-
deered by costs resulting from illegal immigration.
IV. IMPACT ON FEDERALISM, IMMIGRATION POLICY, AND
IMMIGRANTS
A. Federalism
The states' lawsuits over immigration policy may actually
produce a substantive expansion of existing Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Although the states' claims do not fit as neatly
within New York's reasoning as did the Brady Bill Cases, the
particular equities of the current immigration crisis weigh pow-
erfully in favor of the affected states. Most people would agree
that the current imposition of costs on the affected states is
unfair. This essay acknowledges, however, that an unfair situa-
tion does not create a constitutionally enforceable obligation to
remedy the inequity. Nevertheless, the states deserve federal as-
sistance. If they cannot receive this assistance through political
appeals and the courts further turn a deaf ear, people may ques-
tion whether New York's "procedural federalism" provides any
meaningful protection.
O'Connor's "procedural federalism" is primarily concerned
with protecting the integrity of state processes, rather than
defining a substantive realm of state legislative autonomy."
Although substantive federalism is preferable,1" provided it is
185. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA.
L. REV. 633, 650-651 (1993); Wayne 0. Hanewicz, New York v. United States: The
Court Sounds a Return to the Battle Scene, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1605, 1626-27 (1993).
186. This position rests upon a proposition stated both explicitly and implicitly
throughout this essay: limiting the domain of federal power to the extent that any
encroachment on state prerogatives must be justified secures the public good. The
attendant advantages of this federal-state conception are exhaustively noted through-
out the literature. See generally, Gillmor and Eames, Reconstruction of Federalism: A
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feasible,'87 neither approach is without problems." P e r h a p s,
the challenges in applying New York's "commandeer" analysis
will prove too much for a court.'89 Overall, the application of
New York's "autonomy of process" 90 principle to the illegal im-
migration-related costs may disappoint those who wish to see
New York gain strength within limits. One can argue that it is a
stretch to apply New York's doctrine to these lawsuits. As such,
an unprincipled extension of any doctrine necessarily compro-
mises the legitimacy of the doctrine itself.'91 Perhaps New York
is distinguishable from this case on the basis that New York
conceptualized federal-state relations in domestic policy areas,
whereas the affected states' lawsuits involve foreign policy.
Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
395 (1993).
187. The Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985), rejected a judicially enforced notion of federalism. The Court explic-
itly reasoned that such a position invites the judiciary to impose its substantive
views into an area the Framers, arguably, intended to leave to the political process.
Note Justice O'Connor's concurrence which questions the majority's assumption that
federalism is not a substantive theory. In doing so, Justice O'Connor implicitly recog-
nizes a role for the judiciary in defining the federal/state relationship. "The is-
sue . .. is whether the federal system has any legal substance, any core of constitu-
tional rights that courts will enforce." Id. at 580.
188. See Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 349
(1990).
189. If a court were to extend New York's commandeer analysis to the affected
states' suits, it would be critical for the court to narrowly define its holding. Taken
broadly, the application of a ruling in favor of the affected states could grind either
the federal judiciary or the federal government to a halt. As noted supra notes 111,
120 and accompanying text, the affected states' cases hardly depend on the legality
of the immigration. Thus, their argument might be restated as follows: the federal
government is responsible for reimbursing states that suffer adverse economic conse-
quences as a result of legitimate federal policy. One can see, by considering various
hypotheticals, how a court's support of such a proposition would prove unworkable in
today's interdependent economic federal/state relationship.
As an example, consider that the Federal Reserve raises interest rates. Due
to the higher rates, fewer people buy new homes. As housing starts begin to decline,
states particularly dependent on the housing industry experience increases in unem-
ployment. Consequently, these states have to expend more on unemployment ben-
efits. In short, as a result of the federal policy, some states are disproportionately
burdened. Would anyone rationally argue that the federal government is constitution-
ally mandated to reimburse these states for their increased costs?
190. See Powell, supra note 185 ("autonomy of process" is the term given to Jus-
tice O'Connor's process-oriented or procedural federalism; a conception of federalism
concerned with the integrity of the process rather than with the substantive policy
area involved).
191. As Justice O'Connor won victory over those who believe that the Court
should not act as a referee for federal/state relations, she might be loathe to jeop-
ardize the fledgling New York doctrine by applying it to marginal cases.
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Justice O'Connor's procedural or "autonomy of process"
federalism may be the only brand that is practically feasible in
modern politics.'92 The New York opinion may not be expansive
enough for some, but it has at least reinvigorated the idea of a
judicially enforced federalism19' that addresses unfunded man-
dates." Thus, even if the affected states lose their challenges,
their willingness to argue that New York should apply indicates
that the atmosphere is ripe for a constructive reordering of our
federal-state relations. 5
B. Immigrants
This essay contends that maintaining a "healthy" federal-
state balance is beneficial for all citizens, but especially for im-
migrants."6 Voting and non-voting immigrants alike will bene-
fit from a renewed federalism.'9 7 One of the purported benefits
of federalism is to bring decisions closer to the people, thereby
increasing citizen participation in the political process.98 As-
suming that immigrants are politically disempowered,"' they
are especially vulnerable to exclusion from the national political
arena. Cuban-Americans in Miami or Mexican-Americans in
192. See Powell, supra note 185, at 659. "O'Connor has proposed an answer to
'our oldest question of constitutional law' that articulates a judicially enforceable law
of federalism without succumbing to the impractical desire to repudiate the modern
federal government." Id.
193. Id. at 659.
194. Unfunded mandates are an extremely contentious area in federal-state rela-
tions. See Gilimor, supra note 13. The federal government extends the reach of fed-
eral authority in an effort to solve whatever ails the American citizenry. Meanwhile,
the states are directed to administer these federal elixirs using state resources.
195. See the Brady Bill Cases, supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text and
California's Challenge to the Motor-Voter Bill, supra note 13.
196. Reference is to all immigrants regardless of whether they are eligible to
vote.
197. Naturalized citizens would have greater power to shape policies that affect
their lives. Grounding more decisions at the local level will not benefit immigrants
as much as naturalized citizens, eligible to vote. Immigrants (illegal immigrants
included) will benefit, however, to the extent that they can influence local leaders
through non-electoral pressure (ie., public dissatisfaction, protests or demonstrations).
198. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After The New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 504-506 (1987) (arguing that the New Deal's wholesale shift in the locus
of control from the states to the federal government has deprived citizens of the
opportunity to meaningfully participate in self-determination).
199. But see, Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (1984) (arguing that the political influence of recent immi-
grant groups has increased and will continue to rise as their populations grow).
1994] U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & FEDERALISM 91
California may wield significant political power at the local and
state level, but rarely at the federal level. By decentralizing the
decision-making base, immigrants are better off.20 ' After all,
the intended beneficiary of federalism is not the state in its
sovereign capacity, but the individual. 0 1
This essay does not consider the historically anti-immigrant
sentiment that has plagued parochial politics.0 2 Sensibly shift-
ing some power back to the states need not be a euphemism for
trampling minority rights. City or state policies of dubious con-
stitutional validity would still be subject to challenge.0 '
C. Immigration Policy
Now more than ever, people discuss immigration policy as
the economic policy tool it has always been.2°4 The affected
states' suits elicit, and will continue to elicit, debate on the costs
associated with illegal immigration. While Congress will proba-
bly continue its recalcitrance in dispersing any significant money
to ease the affected states' burdens, these cases have prompted
some reconsideration of our immigration policies.0 5 The feder-
al government's increased commitment to effectively patrolling
the borders is testament to this point.0 6
200. [ do not propose federalism as a panacea to completely cure the chronic
political disempowerment many immigrant groups suffer. Rather, I argue that it will
somewhat improve their ability to be heard on issues that closely affect their lives.
201. See Gregory v. Aschcroft, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2399-2400 (1991); see generally
Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988)
202. For a discussion of this history, see Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Im-
ages of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and
Enforcement, 4 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, notes 82-129 and accompanying text (1993).
203. See, e.g., U.S. Judge Blocks Anti-Immigrant Bill, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 16,
1994, at A5 (reporting that Proposition 187 was temporarily enjoined because it may
conflict with federal statutes and/or the Constitution).
204. See generally VERNON M. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
LABOR FORCE (1984).
205. See Michael T. Lempres, The Solution is Immigration Reform, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1994, at A21 (suggesting immigration reforms which are being considered,
as well as those which ought to be considered); see also Neal R. Peirce, The Ugly
-But Inevitable- Debate, NAT'L J., July 16, 1994, at 1700 ("We're moving into the
first major national immigration debate in over 100 years,' said Dan Stein of the
Washington-based Federation for American Immigration Reform."). Id.
206. Operation Hold the Line is a pilot program on the Mexico-California border
which is showing promising results. By increasing Border Patrol personnel and im-
plementing various new techniques, the federal government has drastically reduced
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Overshadowing any benefits derived from this public debate
is the danger that a decision in favor of the states could under-
mine Congress' plenary power over immigration. Even if a court,
in finding for the affected states, explicitly pronounced that its
decision in no way recognized a state's power to influence immi-
gration policy, a state implicitly gains power.
The Supreme Court has consistently denied states any
meaningful role in the administration of immigration policy.0'
Although states have enacted policies that affect immi-
grants,"8 congressional power over immigration policy has
been exclusive.2"
Should one worry about a greater role for states in develop-
ing immigration policy? Is state influence on immigration policy
inherently bad? Consider that federal-state cooperative relations
regarding immigration policy in countries with similar federal-
state governmental structures has proven workable." '
Still, it seems that a better policy is to renounce all state
authority over immigration policy, save for matters that impli-
cate purely state concerns. Immigration is an area that demands
uniform action. Despite the strong anti-immigrant rhetoric
voiced by citizens and politicians alike,21' immigration contin-
ues to be a net benefit for America.212 As such, immigration
policy cannot be driven by the parochial fears of those who mis-
understand or choose to ignore its value.
the rate of illegal aliens who successfally cross into California. See Michael Kirkland,
Efforts to Stem Illegal Aliens Praised, U.P.I., Mar. 14, 1994.
207. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (holding that a state
attempt to tax or regulate immigrants cannot stand in light of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause).
208. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (in which the Supreme
Court upheld a California law that restricted the employment of illegal aliens).
209. Justice Frankfurter stated, in recognition of Congress' plenary power over
immigrants, that "there is not merely 'a page of history'. . . but a whole volume."
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)). See
supra notes 6-7, 37, and the accompanying text.
210. See generally Valerie Mathews Lemieux, Immigration: A Provincial Concern,
13 MANITOBA L.J. 111 (1983) (describing how the Canadian provinces have the pow-
er to set immigration law in certain areas within their federal structure).
211. See David Ferrell and Robert J. Lopez, State Waits To See What Prop. 187
Will Really Mean; Reaction: As Measure Becomes Law, Emotions Range From Fear to
Elation. But There Is Also Great Uncertainty, L.A_ TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at 1.
212. See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
(1989); VERNON M. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE
(1984).
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The constitutional origins of the federal government's broad
power over immigration is well-apparent."1 3 There are also
structural and economic reasons that counsel against the states
having any authority in matters impacting immigration policy.
State politics are "closer to the people." They are less concerned
with the "broader picture" than with the economic well-being of
its citizens. Accordingly, the states are ill-equipped to manage a
national economic resource. Furthermore, state politics are apa-
thetic to foreign policy issues that may demand a national
response.214
In the absence of any sizable state immigrant constituency,
state policies favoring immigration are likely to be exploitative
of immigrants.21 In the alternative, state policies aimed at dis-
couraging immigration may be severe. We would be well-served
to remember Madison's belief that states are more susceptible to
factional tyranny than is the nation."6 Federal policy has often
been a leader; tackling problems that, according to public opin-
ion, would otherwise be left unresolved." 7 Studies that have
shown federal immigration policy to be more generous in accept-
ing immigrants than policy would be if driven by public opin-
ion,"' counsel against allowing states power to determine im-
migration policy.
Just as the states, due to self-interest, are not trusted to
regulate interstate commerce, the states should not be given
immigration policy-making power.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid expansion of federal power within the last sixty
years was, undoubtedly, necessary to accommodate the increased
economic and social interaction that accompanied technological
213. See supra note 6.
214. Take the Cuban crisis for example, where the federal government used
immigration policy to accommodate overall foreign policy objectives.
215. Since public opinion is largely against immigration, see SIMON supra note
3, at 349-356, state policies that favor immigration would probably be less interested
in enhancing cultural diversity and more interested in access to a cheap labor pool.
216. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
217. See infra note 218.
218. See SIMON, supra note 212, at 349-356.
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advances. This essay recognizes the federal government's role in
addressing the social injustice that has stained our national
character." 9 The New Deal's wholesale shift in the presump-
tion of decisionmaking from the local to federal level, however,
has gone too far."' Today, many decisions made at the federal
level could more properly be made at the state and local lev-
el.22" ' While the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
there are "traditional state functions, "222 it has sanctioned the
federal government's imposition of unfunded mandates on the
states.22 In an effort to restore some semblance of a feder-
al/state balance of power, the Court in New York endorsed a
process-oriented federalism.224 The Court held unconstitutional
federal attempts to direct the states to administer a federal pro-
gram.
2 5
Applying New York's reasoning, the federal government's
refusal to reimburse the affected states for immigration-related
costs is unconstitutional. Although the costs are not an explicit
command by the federal government to implement federal immi-
gration policy, the effect is the same. This is because it under-
mines the essence of a state's residuary sovereignty; the right to
exercise its power as it chooses, within its limited sphere.
A court should look beyond the immigration policy as writ-
ten and observe the true impact of its operation. A court ought
not revert to the policy of judicial abdication exhibited in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,226 in which the
Supreme Court cloaked its indifference toward federalism in the
pretext that it is incapable of enforcing the Tenth Amendment.
New York convincingly reasserts that the judiciary should be the
final arbiter in federal-state relations.
219. The federal government's passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1964, to pro-
hibit voting discrimination against Americans of color is a prime example of neces-
sary federal leadership.
220. See Sunstein, supra note 198, at 501-10 (arguing that the New Deal's
abandonment of the "original goals of federalism was myopic."). Id. at 505.
221. See generally Gillmor, supra note 13 (exposing the absurdity of "federaliz-
ing" issues that ought to be handled at the state or local level).
222. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
223. See generally Gillmor, supra note 13.
224. See New York v. U.S., 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
225. Id.
226. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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A court may recognize, without undermining the federal
government's plenary power over immigration policy, that the
federal government has transgressed our "economic federal-
ism""' by unconstitutionally burdening the states. The courts
hearing the affected states' claims must affirm the recent recog-
nition of "economic federalism."28 Anything less would render
New York v. U.S. a paper tiger.
JAHAN SEGATOL-ISLAMI*
227. I use this term to describe a federal-state economic order in which the
federal government's exercise of exclusive power in a policy area ought to be coupled
with a concomitant monetary pledge to offset the most glaringly costly externalities
suffered by states. The economic consequences of federal policy are too often forgot-
ten in the larger federal-state struggle over policy turf. As with most unfunded man-
dates, the affected states are not arguing over who is constitutionally empowered
-- or best able- to act in a particular policy arena. The states, instead, are claiming
that it is unconstitutional for them to have to pay for federal policy. For example, a
federal-state struggle over who can set the minimum drinking age derives from the
states' belief that the issue is beyond the federal government's authority. In contrast,
the affected states' lawsuits concede the federal government's exclusive power to set
immigration policy, but argue over who should pay for it. Although equally legiti-
mate, the states' constitutional arguments are different in kind. The former lays
stake to a specific policy area, while the latter argues that the current federal-state
economic arrangement jeopardizes a state's ability to respond to its citizens needs.
228. See Brady Bill Cases, supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text; see gen-
erally Gillmor, supra note 13.
* J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Miami School of Law.
